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The increasing use of social media and mobile devices by asylum seekers offers new
vetting opportunities for immigration authorities, to verify the identity or to assess
national-security or 1F-exclusion aspects. Based on interviews with practitioners in
Belgium,Germany, theNetherlands,NorwayandSweden, the first experienceswith
both of these newmethods seem to bemixed, while formal evaluations of the results
seem to be lacking.We argue that the increasing reliance on these methods, in com-
bination with the further advancement of technology, raises important questions
aboutpossible infringements on the right toprivate life, aswell as the riskof function
creep and social sorting. It can be questioned to what extent the use of these new
vetting tools and methods is proportional to the results they produce and to what
extent fundamental human rights, including privacy, are sufficiently safeguarded.
Keywords: social media, smartphones, asylum, surveillance, Article 1F
Introduction
Socialmedia andmobile devices (smartphones, tablets, laptops and other portable
digital data carriers) have become almost indispensable tools for migrants, includ-
ing asylum seekers. Recent studies on their use of social media suggest, for in-
stance, that the majority of Syrian asylum applicants have used social media prior
to and during their migration to Europe (Emmer et al. 2016; Gillespie et al. 2016;
Dekker et al. 2018). By providing access to information and a means for naviga-
tion and communication, social media and mobile devices shape the decision-
making on travel routes, travel methods and final destinations, they make
migrants more autonomous and less reliant on smugglers or traditional migration
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network ties, and could enhance migrants’ safety by enabling them to contact
authorities in case of danger (Dekker and Engbersen 2014; Dekker et al. 2016;
Zijlstra and Van Liempt 2017; Alencar et al. 2018; Dekker et al. 2018; Jumbert
et al. 2018). In fact, it has been argued that social media is transforming migration
networks, thereby lowering the threshold for migration (Dekker and Engbersen
2014), even though a ‘digital divide’ still exists: not all nationalities, communities,
ethnicities, sexes or age groups have the same access to information and commu-
nication technologies (Hamel 2009). Smugglers also make use of social media for
advertising their ‘services’ (EMN 2016b; Europol/EMSC 2017; Hacsek and
Visnansky 2017).
While the increasing use of social media and mobile devices is believed to fa-
cilitate unauthorizedmigration, and thus potentially help increase its volume, they
also offer (immigration) authorities in receiving countries new opportunities to
communicate with (prospective) migrants prior to and during their journey, for
example by offering ‘counter-narratives’ (EMN 2016a)—or, one could say, deter-
rence narratives—that detail the dangers of illegal border crossings or provide
factual information about (the difficulties of getting) access to residence permits,
work or allowances (although the effectiveness of such campaigns can be ques-
tioned; see Schans and Optekamp 2016). Additionally, and this is what this con-
tribution will focus on, the increasing use of social media and mobile devices by
asylum seekers also offers new vetting opportunities for immigration authorities.
Social-media activity, open-source information on the Internet and the content
and geodata on mobile devices can potentially be used to verify or debunk claims
made by asylum applicants about e.g. their identity, country of origin or travel
route. Since information that is collected for one objective can also be relevant for
other objectives, such information could furthermore be used to assess whether
applicants pose a threat to the national security or should be excluded from inter-
national protection on the basis of Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
For example, data carriers may contain (photographic) evidence of crimes for-
warded to, witnessed by or perpetrated by the applicant.While a picture in itself is
not necessarily sufficient to have any direct repercussions for the assessment of an
asylum claim, such information can in any case be a reason to ask the applicant to
explain what was found.
Building upon our previous work (Bolhuis and Van Wijk 2018, 2019), this
article discusses whether, to what extent and how European immigration author-
ities are analysing activity and content on social media and mobile devices for the
purpose of (i) establishing and verifying the identity of asylum applicants and (ii)
screening on national-security or 1F-exclusion indications. It maps and describes
these practices in the context of asylum procedures in five European countries that
dealt with a substantial increase in the number of asylum applications from 2015
onwards: Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.What exact-
ly is defined as a threat to ‘national security’, or to the ‘security of the state’, differs
from country to country, but is often based on the alleged involvement in serious
(most notably terrorist) crimes (EMN 2016a).
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After outlining the methodology and providing relevant contextual information
about identity, national security and 1F refugee exclusion vetting during the
heightened asylum influx in Europe from 2015, based on a literature study and
expert interviews, the article will first discuss two empirical questions: (i) what
screening and analysis of social-media profiles and mobile devices are immigration
authorities in Europe currently conducting and (ii) what are the results? In the final
section, we will contextualize the presented empirical information by critically
discussing the legal, normative and societal implications of these new vetting tools.
Based on, inter alia, insights from ‘crimmigration’, big data and privacy literature
(Stumpf 2006; Brouwer 2011; Van der Woude et al. 2017; Privacy International
2019), we argue that the increasing reliance on these methods, in combination with
the further advancement of technology, raises important questions about possible
infringements on the right to a private life, as well as the risk of function creep and
social sorting. It can be questioned to what extent the use of these new vetting tools
and methods is proportional to the results they produce and to what extent fun-
damental human rights, including privacy, are sufficiently safeguarded.
Methodology
This article is based on a combination of expert interviews and a review of avail-
able academic literature, relevant rules and regulations, and available formal and
informal policy documents. The most substantial part of the research was con-
ducted as part of a research project funded by the Norwegian Directorate of
Immigration, the UDI (Bolhuis and Van Wijk 2018).
In the context of the mentioned project, betweenNovember 2017 andMay 2018,
interviews were conducted with a selective sample of 43 representatives of immigra-
tion authorities and aliens police agencies in the five focus countries, as well as
representatives of intelligence and security services and representatives of the
European Asylum Support Office. In the context of this article, especially the
following immigration authorities and aliens police agencies in the five focus coun-
tries will be referred to: the Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and
Stateless persons (CGRS) and the Immigration Office (DVZ) in Belgium; the
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) in Germany; the National
Police’s Department of Aliens, Identification and Human trafficking (AVIM)
and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) in the Netherlands; the
National Police Immigration Service (PU) and the UDI in Norway; and the
Swedish Migration Agency (SMA) in Sweden. Through the researchers’ existing
network and with assistance from the UDI, key respondents were selected in the
initial phase of the research. Once contact was made, additional respondents were
approached using snowball sampling. All envisioned respondents were approached
by either email or telephone with the request to cooperate in this study. They were
informed that the data they provided would be used in a report on behalf of the
Norwegian government and subsequently written academic publications, that their
anonymity would be guaranteed and that the findings would be made publicly
available in the English language. When the approached respondents accepted
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the invitation, where possible, the interviews were conducted face to face. All inter-
views had a semi-structured character and generally lasted for an hour up to 3
hours. The interviews were not audiotaped, but transcripts of the interviews were
made during and directly after the interviews. These transcriptswere sharedwith the
respondents for approval. Respondents were asked to check whether the transcript
was factually correct and/or to provide additional information.
In addition, the authors gathered and analysed relevant academic literature,
policy documents, and rules and regulations on the identification and registration
of asylum seekers, asylum procedures and screening activities related to national-
security and 1F-exclusion cases, including information from two studies con-
ducted by the European Migration Network (EMN 2017a, 2017b). Finally, an
expert meeting was organized at the Center for International Criminal Justice in
Amsterdam on 17 April 2018, entitled ‘Screening and Identification of National
Security and Exclusion Aspects in High Asylum Influx Situations’. Six experts
from Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway participated in the meeting. All of
them were working in the asylum process and had specific expertise on matters of
national security and exclusion. In this article, respondents and participants in the
expert meeting are referred to with codes R# and E#, respectively.
The 2015 Asylum Influx and Issues of Identity, National Security and 1F
Exclusion: A ‘Perfect Storm’
In terms of identity establishment or screening on national-security or 1F-exclusion
indications, the 2015 high influx of—in particular Syrian—asylum seekers could be
considered a ‘perfect storm’. Still picking up the pieces of the ‘economic crisis’ and
after having had a relatively low and stable influx of asylum seekers for years,
European governments were suddenly confronted with a very substantial number
of newly arriving asylum seekers from an active battlefield where numerous war
crimes and crimes against humanity were committed by all parties, including des-
ignated terrorist organizations openly challenging the Western world. Intelligence
and security services perceived these asylum seekers to pose a serious security threat
and, in various European countries, immigration authorities were pressed by politics
andmedia to raise awareness and alertness onwar criminals and terrorists arriving in
Europe by making use of the asylum system (Bolhuis and Van Wijk 2018).
Although, for the largest group of asylum applicants—those of Syrian origin—
lacking documentation represented less of a problem than with groups of other
origins (ibid.: 73), the reliability of Syrian identity documents was questioned by
European immigration authorities. From September 2015 onwards, reports
emerged that legitimate Syrian passports were issued by Syrian embassy offices
with ‘virtually no checks’ (Dawar 2015); that fake passports were widely available
on the black market (Ezadi 2015); and that the Islamic State (IS) had obtained a
substantial number of blank passports as well as passport-printing machines after
seizing Syrian government assets (Marsh 2015). Because of these developments,
authorities could no longer rely on apparently legitimate documents to definitely
establish whether someone actually held Syrian nationality. An additional
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challenge in this context was that Syrian asylum applicants basically only needed
to make it credible that they were Syrian to be granted asylum; therefore, com-
pared to asylum seekers with other nationalities, much less information from
asylum interviews was available to assess whether an applicant had anti-
Western sentiments or had been involved in crimes. Furthermore, because of
the large numbers of asylum applications, relatively little time and few experienced
staff members were available for investigations (Bolhuis and Van Wijk 2018).
What facilitated, but also complicated, the identification of possible war crim-
inals and terrorists was that an unprecedented body of information was available.
Various respondents referred to Syria as the ‘best documented conflict ever’. At
the same time, it could be considered the ‘most messily documented conflict ever’.
Not only did established Western organizations such as Amnesty International,
HumanRightsWatch or the International CrisisGroup publish formal reports, in
addition also Arabic news outlets, the warring parties themselves, bloggers and
citizen journalists posted an unparalleled number of online articles, videos and
blogs about the conflict and the resulting refugee flows. In addition, there was
increased pressure to screen social-media accounts because journalists, activists
and interest groups, on the basis of social-media searches, started publishing in-
formation about the alleged criminal background of asylum seekers in Europe on
dedicated websites. Evidence of the commission of serious crimes in the Middle
East was available for analysis almost in real time, sometimes distributed by the
perpetrators themselves, sometimes tampered with or forged. Immigration
authorities had to develop strategies, routines and protocols on how to deal
with this profusion of data. In addition, many of the relatively well-to-do
Syrian asylum seekers who entered Europe were active social-media users and
arrived with smartphones and computers that contained an abundance of—pos-
sibly relevant, but also much irrelevant—information. The context in which
European immigration authorities had to assess asylum claims was complex
and challenging. Within a short time frame, they were confronted with a large
group of asylum seekers from theMiddle East, while there was much political and
societal pressure to critically assess whether these applicants posed a threat to
national security. Because of the increased use of social media and data carriers,
there was an abundance of information available to analyse: how to go about it?
Social-Media and Mobile-Device Analysis in Europe
In the challenging environment described above, analysing content from social
media and mobile devices has become increasingly relevant for immigration
authorities. This paragraph describes to what extent and how these methods are
used and what is known about their results.
To What Extent and How Is the Method of Social-Media Analysis Used?
The synthesis report of a 2017 study performed by the EMN into practices in
establishing the identity of asylum applicants notes that the analysis of publicly
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accessible social-media content became standard practice in recent years in inter
alia Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway as well as two other EU Member
States, while it is optionally used by 11 other Member States, among them
Sweden (EMN 2017b: 32). The increasing use of social-media research seems to
be unrelated to the scale of the high influx from 2014 and can rather be explained
by the advancement of technology and by the nature of the influx, namely the fact
that, in particular, Syrian asylum seekers were relatively active on social media
and often had smartphones at their disposal compared to asylum seekers from
other countries (R31, R32, R34, R35). Arguably, the interest in using social-media
analysis was not only given by the new possibilities that it offered to check some-
one’s identity. As mentioned above, there was also increased pressure to screen
social-media accounts because journalists, activists and interest groups, on the
basis of social-media searches, started publishing information about the alleged
criminal background of asylum seekers in Europe on dedicated websites.
Our study confirms that, except for Germany, in all of the other four focus
countries, immigration authorities use this kind of analysis, for the establishment
of identity as well as for screening on national-security and exclusion indications.
In 2018, the German BAMF informed us that it was exploring possibilities for
conducting social-media analysis in the future, but that it had thus far not been
using the method (R38). Whether the method is used in all cases or selectively
differs between the countries. In the Netherlands, the IND conducts an analysis of
social media and other open-source information in all cases, as part of a separate
procedural step referred to as ‘screening’, which was introduced inMarch 2016. In
the other three countries, social-media analysis is conducted selectively. In
Belgium, social-media analysis is only conducted by the CGRS in cases in which
there are certain indications or doubts about the information provided by the
applicant; according to respondents, the choice of such a selective use of social-
media analysis was made in particular because the method is time-consuming
(R22, R23). In Norway and Sweden, individual caseworkers of the UDI and
SMA decide whether or not to use the method. A UDI representative indicated
in this respect that whether the method was used mainly depended on the famil-
iarity of the caseworker with social media; younger caseworkers would use it more
often than older caseworkers. However, from the end of 2016, social-media ana-
lysis started to be applied more systematically by the UDI (R7).
In the four countries, social-media research is generally conducted by regular
caseworkers, who typically have been provided with some guidelines, instructions
and training on how to conduct social-media research. In the Netherlands as well
as in Sweden, they are for example instructed not do social-media vetting with a
private computer or a private account (IND2016; R43). In Belgium, this guidance
seems to have taken the most concrete form. As part of a special project on the
implementation of the use of Facebook for social-media research, the Belgian
CGRS has established a specialized unit falling under its country-of-origin infor-
mation desk. This ‘NewMedia Unit’ provides continuous training to caseworkers
on how to engage in social-media research. Next to providing guidance and train-
ing, the unit also assists caseworkers in carrying out actual social-media research;
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it for example has staff members who read Arabic and Russian and may take on
‘difficult’ cases such as 1F-exclusion cases (CGRS 2017). Similarly, Sweden and
the Netherlands have specialist teams that can assist caseworkers in (using social
media in) possible exclusion or national-security cases (R31, R43).
As caseworkers of the immigration services only use information that is publicly
available, in principle, cooperation from the applicant is not required. An appli-
cant could, however, be asked specifically to disclose information on social media
that may be relevant to the asylum application. In Belgium, an amendment of the
Immigration Act created the possibility for the CGRS to ‘invite’ the applicant to
submit any relevant information on social media in case there are any suspicions
that he or she withholds information (EMNNCP Belgium 2017: 40). Refusing to
disclose information on social media can be taken into account in deciding upon
the application, when there are other indications that may possibly be a reason to
deny the application. Refusing to cooperate in this sense may also be a reason to
ask the intelligence services for information (R20).
Training available online by a social-media analysis specialist from the Belgian
CGRS gives a good idea about some of the practical problems encountered in
social-media analysis by immigration authorities, as well as someof the techniques
and tools to overcome these problems (CGRS2017). In linewith the remarks from
the CGRS specialist in this training, several respondents noted that, if social-
media analysis—or, for that matter, even a simple online search—is performed
in an ad hoc or incautious manner, this may have severe consequences for the
confidentiality of the asylum procedure and may even be illegal. For instance, a
respondent of the Norwegian PU gave the example that, when caseworkers would
type in the name of applicants in a search engine from their offices with the goal of
obtaining more information on these individuals, this search engine could easily
register from which address the search for this particular name is conducted.
Consequently, thismay create possibilities for third parties, such as the authorities
of the applicants’ country of origin, to identify in what country the individual
applied for asylum. For this reason, the respondent warned that only authorities
with the right expertise should be engaged in social-media analysis (R12). Swedish
andDutch respondents also acknowledged that probing into a case of someone in
need of protection by the immigration services might leave traces, which carries
the risk of impeaching on confidentiality (R28, R31, R32). For this reason, the
Dutch IND uses standalone computers with special software and special accounts
to safely perform open-source and social-media research. These ‘Internet detective
network’ (iRN) computers have been developed by the Dutch National Police in
collaboration with a commercial cyber-security company (R31, R32).
To What Extent and How Is the Method of Mobile-Device Analysis Used?
Apart from social-media analysis, another development that coincided with the
high influx of asylum seekers is the extraction of information frommobile devices
or ‘data carriers’, such as smartphones and laptops, that asylum applicants may
carry on them. The confiscation of data carriers is currently standard practice in
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theNetherlands, optional inNorway andGermany, while it is not used inBelgium
and Sweden (EMN 2017b: 32). In the Netherlands and Norway, the aliens police
(the AVIM and PU, respectively) confiscate and extract the data carriers, as they
have a role in identity establishment; in Germany, this is done by the BAMF
(EMN NCP the Netherlands 2017: 45; Klunderud 2017: 13). Where, in the
Netherlands and Norway, the aliens police—on the basis of their police man-
date—are tasked with establishing or verifying an asylum seeker’s identity, this
is different in Belgium, Germany and Sweden. Because police authorities are
hardly involved in the identification and registration of asylum seekers in these
countries, the legal possibilities of extracting information from data carriers are
much more limited. Arguably, the actors responsible for identification and regis-
tration in Belgium, Germany and Sweden may in addition lack the (police) ‘cul-
ture’ to look for information by means of methods such as extracting data from
telephones. This possibly explains why Belgium and Sweden at the moment of our
study did not use data-carrier extraction at all and, in Germany, the method can
only be used under strict conditions, as will be explained below.
The confiscation and extraction of data carriers are used on the largest scale and
in the most far-reaching way in the Netherlands. Since the influx increased, the
AVIM subject all data carriers to a general check (a staff member takes a ‘quick
look’ by scrolling through the content on the data carrier). Depending on signals
resulting from the quick look or other methods used during the identification
process, the data carrier may be selected for further investigation, consisting of
reading out and extracting all the data on the carrier. According to an inspection
report of the Dutch Inspectorate of Justice and Security (2016), Universal
Forensic Extraction Devices, or UFEDs, are used for this; they have software
that transports data to the authorities’ own computers and enables them to ana-
lyse this (p. 22). At the time of the publication of the report (November 2016), the
number of fully extracted smartphones was about 7 per day on an average of 30
asylum seekers, which was the maximum capacity at the time (ibid.: 33). There
may also be reasons to submit the data carrier for forensic digital examination by
investigative authorities outside the identification and registration process (EMN
NCP the Netherlands 2017: 45). Hence, currently, not all confiscated data carriers
are also extracted. However, a redesign for the identification and registration
process does provide for 100 per cent extraction of data from data carriers
(R1). The introduction of the extraction of a limited number of data carriers
was possible within the existing legislative context; the terms ‘documents and
records’ laid down in the Dutch Aliens Act 2000 (Article 55(2)) have been inter-
preted in a broad fashion by judges in relation to the establishment of identity and
data carriers are seen to fall within the scope of these terms (EMN NCP the
Netherlands 2017: 17). Currently, it is legally not possible to extract data from
confiscated data carriers in all cases, but only in cases where it is expected that this
will produce information that is relevant for assessing the application for a resi-
dence permit (personal communication with an officer of the DutchAliens Police,
11 December 2019).
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In Norway, legislation permits the PU to (temporarily or permanently) confis-
cate data carriers and access their content in the context of establishing or verify-
ing the identity. Similarly to the Netherlands, these searches are laid down
indirectly in the legislation (Klunderud 2017: 13). Checking the content on smart-
phones already started before 2015, but was initially done on an ad hoc basis (R9,
R12). Over time, a more structural approach has been adopted. If the content on
the data carriers is to be accessed, the data carrier will be extracted by a specialized
digital forensics unit at the PU. The decision to extract information from data
carriers is made ad hoc, based on informal criteria. For example, a single Syrian
male between the ages of 20 and 40 is very likely to have his phone extracted, even
if his documentation does not seem to be problematic. For other nationalities, if
applicants have no or clearly forged identity documents, something seems to be
wrong with the identity documents or if the applicant’s statements lead to doubts
about the identity, this may lead to the decision to read out data carriers (R12).
The German BAMF has only recently started extracting data carriers, after
amendments to legislation were introduced in 2015 to make this possible
(Tangermann 2017: 35). The BAMF can only extract data for the purpose of
establishing the identity, but not for other purposes, such as reconstructing the
travel route, let alone assessing aspects of national security or 1F exclusion. The
software that is used for data extraction does provide information about loca-
tions, but does not link this, for example, to time stamps (R39, R40).
Furthermore, the method can only be used if no less intrusive method is available
(R38). A legal expert from the BAMF needs to assess the proportionality of the
storage (or ‘validation’) of the data because, once the data has been validated, it is
analysed by software and the applicant’s privacy may be affected. After approval
of the use of the method by the legal expert, a report of the analysis is generated
and added to the applicant’s file (R39). The measure is not allowed when there are
indications that analysing data carriers would provide only insights ‘into the core
area of private life’. If such insights are acquired, they may not be utilized and any
records thereof have to be deleted immediately. Awritten record has to bemade of
the fact of their acquisition and deletion. Personal data acquired through this
method that is no longer necessary for the purpose of establishing the identity
or nationality has to be deleted immediately (Tangermann 2017: 22–24).
Based onEUand national data-protection legislation, the applicant’s consent is
required before data carriers can be extracted. However, such consent is ‘relative’,
meaning that asylum seekers who wish to lodge a successful application in actual
practice do not have much ‘bargaining power’. Although a refusal to cooperate
can in and of itself not be a ground for denying asylum, it will be an element that
will be taken into account in the evaluation of the asylum application (R11, R17,
R20). In the Netherlands, for example, the IND can reject an asylum application
as manifestly unfounded in the event that the third-country national does not
cooperate in or even thwarts the establishment of his or her identity (EMN
NCP theNetherlands 2017: 52). InGermany, applicants have a general obligation
to cooperate in determining their identity. This duty to cooperate was also
extended to data carriers: on request, asylum applicants have to present and
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hand over all data carriers in their possession that may help to establish their
identity and nationality. If the applicant fails to meet this obligation while there
are indications that he or she is in possession of data carriers, the authorities can
search the applicant and his belongings. The applicant should also hand over
passwords or other information necessary to access the devices. In case of refusal,
data can also be obtained from telecommunication providers (Tangermann 2017:
21–24).
What Are the Results?
Determining the value of the use of these methods for decision-making may de-
pend on the purpose for which they are used, the (legal) conditions under which
they can be used and which actor employs them. This section describes to what
extent and in what ways the methods described above have resulted in (improved)
identity establishment and identifying national-security or 1F-exclusion indica-
tions. As none of the respondents was aware of the existence of any national or
comparative evaluations that assess the effectiveness of social-media analysis or
data-carrier extraction for these purposes, we will in this regard largely rely on the
(subjective) observations made by our respondents.
Identity Establishment
Several authors note that the use of digital surveillance may lead to a change in
behaviour among migrants (e.g. Broeders and Engbersen 2007; Jumbert et al.
2018). Dekker et al. (2018: 7) found evidence that migrants who are aware of
surveillance by authorities would stop using social media and smartphones en
route (for instance, by turning off the devices or the Wi-Fi signal) because of
the surveillance itself or because their smugglers would prohibit the use.
Moreover, they expect that it is likely that migrants employ counterstrategies to
divert surveillance, by erasing or getting rid of their smartphones before entering
the asylum procedure (ibid.: 10). Gillespie et al. (2016) found migrants were using
avatars and pseudonyms to hide their identities on social media and online. Such
behaviour is not necessarily intended to trick authorities in destination countries,
but may nonetheless problematize screening activities. A New York Times article
reported that migrants have been commonly asked to provide Facebook pass-
words at checkpoints in Syria by both government and IS forces, in order to
determine their allegiance in the conflict (Brunwasser 2015). Jumbert et al.
(2018) note that users may have adapted or self-censured the content on their
social-media accounts and mobile devices because of this.
Our respondents had different views on whether and how screening of social
media and the content of data carriers complements their work in trying to estab-
lish an asylum seeker’s identity. First, it is noteworthy to mention that different
respondents stressed that these methods are not only useful to identify problems
with regard to a claimed identity, but that it can also make a claim stronger if it is
consistent with other information (EMNNCPBelgium 2017: 40; R28, R29). That
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said, some respondents believed that, because of the above-presented ‘counter-
strategies’, the value of social-media analysis and data-carrier screening in estab-
lishing identity should not be exaggerated, pointing out that they saw a trend
where applicantswere increasingly showing upwithout a smartphone or any other
personal belongings on them (R7, R14, R15, R16, R38). Some of these same
respondents, however, also noted that, as there are few leads in the early phase
of the asylum procedure, any available lead is valuable and that in particular the
method of data-carrier extraction could produce such leads (R14, R15, R16).
Other respondents, in particular representatives of theDutch andBelgium author-
ities, were more positive about the results and future perspectives of these new
screening tools. Representatives of the Dutch IND considered social-media re-
search and data-carrier extraction as very useful, despite possible changes in the
use of social media and smartphones by asylum applicants. For a period, there
was a suspicion that more applicants were aware that social media was systemat-
ically screened and that less information surfaced but, according to respondents,
the analysis still produced a lot of useful information. The respondents did report
that there had been cases inwhich they had indications that applicants had set up a
fake account as a matter of window dressing or cases in which applicants had
several accounts. However, in the experience of Dutch respondents, applicants
have to really prepare well to properly conceal that they have set up fake accounts,
as data carriers can also be extracted (R31, R32). According to the Belgian EMN
NCP, information from social media has proven valuable in particular in cases in
which there are doubts regarding the credibility of the asylummotives, country or
region of origin or potential exclusion cases.
What furthermore became apparent from the interviews is that the value of
information taken from social media regularly is a source of discussion among the
immigration authorities. One Norwegian caseworker, for example, referred to
discussions with younger colleagues who concluded that an applicant must have
been Syrian because they found that he had a Syrian flag as his profile picture and
had many Syrian friends (R7). Another Norwegian respondent referred to cases
that had been turned down because asylum seekers had claimed to be underage,
while it had been found out that their Facebook account mentioned they were 21.
The respondent questioned the value of the evidence taken from social media in
those cases, as it is not uncommon for young social-media users to present them-
selves online with a different age, because it may otherwise not be possible to
create an account in the first place (R12). German respondents noted that a lot of
the information on social media is only available in Arabic and that special inter-
pretation or analysis software is needed to actually make sense of it. More gen-
erally, one respondent warned that social-media analysis is of limited use when
there is lack of knowledge among caseworkers about how to find information on
social media (R7). A particular challenge in Germany has been the size of the
influx; doing a proper social-media check on all applicants was simply not feasible.
German respondents also referred to problems with regard to privacy protection
and legal limitations in collecting and storing personal data (R38, R39).
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Finally, we have to stress that, when it comes to information obtained bymeans
of data-carrier extraction, the sharing of such information may lead to complex-
ities. This is in particular apparent in the Netherlands and Norway, where the
aliens police are involved in the identification and registration of asylum seekers,
but not in the decision-making in asylum procedures. Whether or not—and in
what way—the information obtained from data carriers is available and useful for
decision-making depends on the ways in which information exchange between the
different authorities is organized. Norwegian respondents indicated that this issue
has been the subject of intense debate between the PUandUDI. The PUhas taken
the position that extracted information cannot always be shared with the immi-
gration service, for which reason it draws up selective reports—a very time-
consuming activity (R9, R11). UDI representatives indicated that there was a
feeling that the amount and quality of information shared by the PU was too
selective (R5, E6). In the Netherlands, respondents generally indicated not having
experienced many problems in relation to information exchange between the
AVIM and the IND.
National Security and 1F Exclusion
Information from open sources and social media is becoming increasingly import-
ant in international crimes investigations (Koenig 2017; Human Rights Center
UC Berkeley School of Law 2018; Mehandru and Koenig 2019). Due to the
increasing availability of smartphones, citizens have easy access to tools to record,
document and share evidence via the Internet. These ‘citizen witnesses’ can offer
first-hand accounts, because they are often among the first to be on the scene
where crimes occur; if recorded properly, the photos or footage of the crime or
crime scene they record may be useful as evidence (Gregory 2015). Asylum appli-
cants may also have photos or footage on their mobile devices or social media
incriminating themselves. In fact, visual material found on social-media accounts
or mobile devices of immigrants—be it witnesses or perpetrators—has played a
decisive role in several terrorism andwar-crimes prosecutions with respect to Syria
and Iraq that emerged in recent years (especially war crimes of outrage upon
personal dignity; see Eurojust 2018), notably in Finland, Germany, Sweden
(Eurojust 2018), the Netherlands (District Court of The Hague, judgments of
23 July 2019, ECLI: NL: RBDHA: 2019:7430; and ECLI: NL: RBDHA:
2019:7431; NOS 2019), as well as in a recent case in the situation of Libya before
the International Criminal Court (Pre-Trial Chamber I 2017). The fact that such
evidence has resulted in criminal convictions illustrates that photos and videos
found on social media and mobile devices can be a valuable source for immigra-
tion services with respect to identifying national-security threats or 1F-exclusion
cases—especially considering that the standard of proof is lower than the criminal-
law standard of proof in both 1F-exclusion cases (Fitzpatrick 2000) and national-
security cases (inmost of the European countries, a danger to the national security
is assumed on the basis of an individual report drafted by the national or a foreign
intelligence service; assuming such a danger is not dependent on a criminal
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conviction). However, from the interviews, it becomes clear that it is not self-
evident that these sources of information are in this respect always useful or easily
usable.
Various respondents noted that, in general, data carriers and social media are
valuable sources of information for assessing national-security or exclusion
aspects. A representative of the SMA, for example, indicated that information
from these sources is useful in addition to the contextual country-of-origin infor-
mation (COI) provided by the COI desk, because it is more concrete about indi-
viduals (R28; see alsoKlunderud 2017: 13). Dutch respondents also indicated that
information from social media and data carriers is seen as a welcome addition
when information from other sources (i.e. statements from applicants) is limited.
While they noted that statements by asylum applicants were still the main source
for substantiating 1F decisions in the Netherlands, the importance of information
from social media was growing. Whether this was also true in the context of
national-security assessments, in the Netherlands or in the other countries, cannot
be said on the basis of the interviews. The only indication we have of the value of
these methods for national-security assessments relates to the ‘screening’ that is
conducted by the IND, of which the social-media research and analysis of data-
carrier content are an important part. In a small assessment conducted by the IND
on the period fromOctober 2016 toApril 2017, it turned out thatmore than 60 per
cent of all signals that were reported to the intelligence services by the IND came
from the screening (R34). The remainder of this section therefore focuses on 1F
exclusion.
Similarly to establishing an asylum seeker’s identity, respondents also indicated
that information from social media and data carriers on possible involvement in
atrocities or terrorist organizations is often very difficult to interpret andmay lead
to discussions. As a respondent of the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST)
noted: if you see a brutal photo on an applicant’s cell phone, is that because he is
documenting what is happening during the war or is it his hand holding the knife?
(R8). The head of the PST, Erik Haugland, noted the following in an interview
with a Norwegian newspaper:
Theremaybe several reasons for having such images.You canbe awitness andwant
to show others what you have seen, or you may have symbols linked to organiza-
tions that control areas you pass through for tactical reasons.What looks alarming
can have other explanations than support for terrorist organizations.
He added: ‘One problem for us is that we hardly ever have any history of these
people, even from countries we work closely with’ (Johnsen 2015). Whether the
information can be used as evidence for substantiating decisions on asylum appli-
cations, particularly in national-security or 1F-exclusion decisions, is therefore not
self-evident. A representative of the Norwegian immigration service even noted
that the value of information from these sources as evidence is limited.A picture of
an applicant with an IS flag in his hand on a public profile, for instance, would
never be enough in itself to have a decisive impact on the outcome of a case. At the
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same time, the information may still be relevant to actors such as the intelligence
and security services (R33). A representative of the Dutch IND gave the example
of a Syrian applicant who, during the interview, had claimed to have lived in
Damascus his whole life, while pictures had been found of him in the city of
Aleppo, dressed in a military outfit and with a Kalashnikov in his hands.
Although this information is in itself not enough for exclusion, it does lead to a
suspicion that the applicant has ‘something to hide’ (the limits of what the immi-
gration services can do with information from social media to substantiate 1F
decisions are also painfully illustrated in a documentary that was broadcast on
Dutch television in 2017; see KRO-NCRV 2017).
The following two 1F-exclusion cases from the Netherlands illustrate how the
IND, sometimes successfully and sometimes not, has tried to substantiate 1F-
exclusion decisions based on information obtained on social media and other
online open sources.
Hell canons
In this case the IND concluded that a Syrian applicant had been involved as a
commander in military actions in which ‘hell cannons’ (heavy improvised weapons)
were used against civilians,which amounts to awar crime.The 1Fdecision—against
which the applicant unsuccessfully appealed in court—was based on five different
sources of evidence: i) an interview the applicant had given to Associated Press
journalists inGreece in which he claimed he had been commander of a rebel faction,
ii) his own statements to the immigration services where he inter alia stated he had
been a (military) commander and had been involved in founding the Fastaqem
Kama Umirt organisation (FKU), iii) images found on the internet: photos depict-
ing the applicant in a military outfit and with a weapon, iv) reports about the mili-
tary activity of the FKU including the use of hell cannons, and v) a video found on
YouTube in which the applicant reads out a statement by the Fastaqem Kama
Umirt organisation, after which a hell cannon is loaded and fired and other missiles
are fired (District Court of The Hague, judgment of 6 October 2016, ECLI: NL:
RBDHA : 2016:12007; judgment of 28 July 2017, ECLI:NL:RBDHA : 2017:9798).
In the context of this contribution, it is in particular relevant to stress that the court
noted that ‘these images strengthen the supposition’ that the applicant was involved
in themilitary actions and thus facilitatedwar crimes. Furthermore, it noted that the
fact that his exact involvement in the crimes has not been established in accordance
with a criminal law standard is not relevant, as that is not needed for a 1F exclusion
(District Court TheHague, judgment of 6October 2016, pp. 6, 10, 13, translation by
authors).
Facebook likes
In a second case, a 1F-exclusion decisionwas substantiated inter alia by the fact that
the applicant’s Facebook page showed he was a member of the Syrian Social
Nationalist Party (SSNP)—a satellite party of the ruling Ba’ath party—and had
placed a ‘like’ at a photo of members of the air force intelligence service in Aleppo.
Furthermore, the INDhad found several messages on Facebook, Twitter and other
social media in which the Syrian applicant was accused of participating in the
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suppression of demonstrations in Aleppo and supporting the Shabiha militia.
Finally, the applicant’s name was mentioned on a list of people financing the
Shabiha that was available on the website of the Syrian Revolution General
Commission (District Court of The Hague, judgment of 8 August 2017, ECLI:
NL: RBDHA : 2017:12846, at 9). In this case the District Court ruled that the
assumption that the SSNP was to be held accountable for crimes committed by
the regime was not substantiated sufficiently. Furthermore, from the information
found on the internet and social media, the court reasoned that it does not become
clear that the applicant was personally involved in the suppression of demonstra-
tions. That hewas accused on socialmedia of involvement in the Shabiha andkilling
demonstrators is not enough to establish his personal involvement, as these sources
cannot be considered to be objective and ‘everyone can post messages there’. That
the applicant ‘liked’ a photo of members of the air force intelligence service also
cannot lead to the conclusion that he was involved in crimes committed by the
regime. Finally, the court considered that if it were likely that the applicant indeed
supported the Shabiha financially, this in itself is not enough to conclude he facili-
tated 1F crimes. The court noted that the applicant’s uncooperative attitude is in-
sufficient to come to such a conclusion (ibid.: 11).
These examples show that information from social media may raise a suspicion
that someone has been involved in 1F crimes, but the information still needs to be
sufficiently specific about the individual’s role to be suitable as supporting evi-
dence. However, a Dutch respondent noted that the ‘classic’ substantiation of
exclusion decisions detailing the crime, place and time is hardly achievable any-
more, given the decreasing value of applicants’ statements (R34), as also noted
above. This led the IND to adopt a different approach in substantiating 1F-ex-
clusion decisions. While the Dutch immigration service would typically focus on
substantiating that the applicant was a member of a certain organization and that
this organization has been guilty of 1F crimes, in the new approach, the reasoning
is ‘turned around’. For instance, it is now argued that the sum of the fact that (i)
someone was at a certain location where he had no business, (ii) in a uniform, (iii)
with a weapon in his hand, combined with the fact that (iv) he has made implaus-
ible or demonstrably untruthful statements about this event, leads to the suppos-
ition that there is no other explanation than to assume the applicant has (actively)
participated in an armed conflict in which war crimes have been committed, which
could be enough to constitute ‘serious reasons for considering’ that the applicant
committed (or facilitated) 1F crimes. At the time of data collection, the IND was
trying to find out to what extent this way of motivating an exclusion decision is
accepted in court. The respondent acknowledged that this leads to the question of
whether the threshold for exclusion is de facto lowered. The IND, however,
reasons that the approach has changed, but the standard of proof remains
the same. Increasingly, use ismade of legal advisers in drafting exclusion decisions,
in order to translate information from images into evidence for a judge to
review (R34).
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Social-Media Analysis and Data-Carrier Extraction: The Way Forward?
As discussed above, the use of social-media analysis and data-carrier extraction to
vet asylum seekers has increased over recent years, in the context of both identity
establishment and screening on national-security and 1F-exclusion aspects. Based
on the interviews that we conducted, the first experiences with both of these new
methods seem to be mixed. It is striking to note that there seem to be ‘believers’
and ‘non-believers’ in these methods. As became clear in the previous section,
representatives from countries that more actively use these methods or have more
legal powers to use them, such as the Netherlands and Norway with regard to
reading out data carriers, are generally positive about the possibilities and results,
while representatives from countries that use thesemethods to a lesser extent or do
not have the legal possibilities to do so, such as Belgium and Sweden with regard
to data-carrier extraction, are more sceptical and refer to various—presumed—
disadvantages. Assessments of the value of information obtained through these
new methods are so far based mainly on anecdotal evidence, rather than system-
atic evaluations. The use of the methods may lead to adaptations in behaviour of
asylum seekers, and so increasing reliance on them may undermine the effective-
ness and diminish the results of the methods. In the context of screening on 1F-
exclusion aspects, the evidentiary value is also not self-evident, as was illustrated
above. In absence of other means to collect sufficient evidence to assess asylum
applicants’ involvement in crimes, it is understandable that immigration author-
ities are increasingly exploring whether and to what extent they can use ‘digital
evidence’. As illustrated above, criminal prosecutors currently use similar
approaches in trying to hold returning foreign fighters or asylum seekers and
other migrants criminally accountable for involvement in atrocities or terrorism
in the Middle East. It is also understandable that immigration authorities are
testing new ways to substantiate 1F-exclusion decisions. In this regard, however,
considering the serious consequences for individuals who are excluded on the basis
of Article 1F (Reijven and Van Wijk 2014), care should be taken in reaching
conclusions based on information that is often inconclusive.
To independently assess whether or not the presumed costs of social-media
analysis and data-carrier extraction outweigh the possible benefits is currently
virtually impossible. The costs—in terms of human resources dedicated to per-
form social-media screening and setting up systems to enable data-carrier extrac-
tion and analyse all the obtained data—are certainly substantial. The benefits—in
terms of improved identity establishment and improved screening of national-
security and 1F-exclusion cases—are of yet ‘sketchy’ at best and based on anec-
dotal evidence. One indication of the balance between costs and benefits can be
deduced, however, from answers provided by the German BAMF to questions
from the opposition party, Die Linke (see Thüer et al. 2018). According to the
provided information, in 9 months from September 2017, BAMF extracted data
from mobile devices of almost 15000 persons unable to produce any identity
papers. In approximately one-third of the approximately 5000 cases for which
the information was actually accessed, the data supported the information
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provided by the applicants; in almost two-thirds the BAMF concluded the infor-
mation was not relevant in terms of establishing identity and origin; and in only
around 100 cases did the data contradict what the applicant had stated initially.
Thüer et al. (2018) argue that, given that approximately 230000 asylum applica-
tions were decided in this period, this result is disproportional to the investments
made in the technology and the infringement on the privacy of applicants.
Furthermore, the figures also suggest that the measure is not used only as a
‘last resort’, as required by law. Based on the interviews, the authors have the
impression that sound evaluations with proper cost–benefit analyses of these new
methods are not—or at least not publicly—available. This impairs a fact-based
and normative debate on whether or not, and to what extent, the implementation
of such methods is recommendable. Hence, there is a clear need for such
evaluations.
Apart from questions regarding effectiveness and cost-efficiency, the increasing
reliance on these methods, in combination with the further advancement of tech-
nology, raises a number of practical, legal, normative and ethical questions that
are currently hardly (publicly) discussed. As for the increasing reliance on social-
media research in the immigration context, there seem to be no fundamental
objections against per se, but practical improvements are possible and it does raise
some legal and ethical concerns. Respondents in our study, for example, indicated
that guidelines on ‘who does what’ are not always available. Moreover, as one
respondent mentioned, the boundary of how far and by which means a non-
investigative administrative authority such as the immigration authority may em-
ploy such searches in examining an immigration or asylum case is increasingly
blurred (R11). One observation that can be made from our study is that immi-
gration services—in line with the developments described in ‘crimmigration’ lit-
erature (Stumpf 2006; Van der Woude et al. 2017)—are gradually taking steps to
move closer towards conducting criminal investigations. The special computers
that the Dutch IND uses to perform social-media analysis, which have been
developed by the National Police, are an illustration of this development. The
gradual move in the direction of criminal investigation, resulting from pressure
from politics and the society, means that the expectations from immigration
authorities are higher, although it is yet unclear whether they—even with these
increased investigative tools—can actually ‘live up’ to these expectations. The use
of anonymous or ‘fake’ Facebook accounts to perform social-media searches
could perhaps be seen as problematic, but one might argue that applicants cannot
credibly object to the use of information that they have consciously disclosed to
the public. It becomes more questionable when immigration authorities engage in
the vetting of non-public parts of social media. As Meaker (2018) describes, the
Danish immigration authorities ask asylum applicants in some cases to provide
their Facebook passwords so that they can access what cannot be easily found;
upon refusal, the applicant will be told that he is obliged to cooperate under
Danish law. The US immigration authorities have already implemented a policy
whereby (even) visa applicants are required to submit information about social-
media accounts they have used in the past (Garcia 2019).
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However, it is especially the vetting of mobile ‘data carriers’ such as smart-
phones that raises serious legal, normative and ethical concerns. Over time, the
data-storage capacities on these devices have increased and the number of appli-
cations for which these can be used is growing. As a result, these mobile devices
contain more and more personal information. Confiscating and extracting data
from such devices today thus implies a strong infringement on the right to a
private life as protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (Royer and Oerlemans 2017: 280). In particular, in countries where there
is no sound legal basis or when it can be proven that the applied methods are not
effective in reaching its objectives (lack of proportionality), it may even be in
violation of European or national legislation.
It is interesting to note the differences between the focus countries when it
comes to the extent to which privacy considerations played a role in the introduc-
tion of data-carrier research. As noted above, in the Netherlands, the introduction
of the method was deemed possible within the existing legislative framework.
Consequently, the introduction was not discussed in parliament; it went by largely
unnoticed and did not create much public or political upheaval. In Belgium and
Germany, on the other hand, legislative changes were required and their intro-
duction led to considerable debate. In Germany, different organizations voiced
data-protection concerns in reaction to the announcement of the introduction of
data-carrier extraction. For instance, opposition party Die Linke (‘The Left’)
described the method as ‘an infringement on citizen’s rights, seeing that mobile
phones could be analysed without a court order even if there was no suspicion of a
crime’. The opposition party Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (‘Alliance 90/The Greens’)
opposed that the scope of the method was ill-defined. Civil-society organizations
were critical about the way in which the use of these methods would affect the
(confidential) relationship during interviews with the BAMF (Biselli 2017;
Tangermann 2017: 49). Respondents in our study also indicated that data pro-
tection in general is a sensitive issue in Germany (R38, R39, R40). These factors
could explain the relatively strict conditions under which, and the limited purpose
for which, the method can be used. In Belgium, the introduction of the compe-
tence to extract information from data carriers by the CGRS was preceded by
extensive debate in parliament and society on the issue of whether accessing in-
formation on data carriers was only possible after approval of the applicant or
whether such cooperation could also be enforced. The Belgian Privacy
Commission in this regard issued negative advice on the initial proposal, criticiz-
ing it for lacking provisions on how applicants would be asked to give access to
data carriers in their possession, how the collected datawould be stored and how it
would be analysed. The UNCHR was also critical on the issue of the applicant’s
consent (R20; EMNNCPBelgium 2017: 60). As a result of this debate, the law, in
its final form, requires that access to data carriers can only be obtained on the basis
of the applicant’s consent (R17, R20). However, as noted above, applicants may
not have much leeway to refuse their cooperation in this sense. It has been argued
that, when permission is asked by an entity that is in a position of power over the
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individual or the individual is not in a position to disagree, this can in fact not be
qualified as ‘consent’ (Privacy International 2019).
Apart from privacy issues, concerns could be raised regarding data protection
and the potential use of information initially gathered for the purpose of identity
establishment at a later stage for different purposes—the risk of a so-called ‘func-
tion creep’ (Brouwer 2011: 274). One example of function creep, already referred
to by Brouwer (2011: 282), is the access to the Eurodac fingerprint database that
law-enforcement authorities have had since 2015 for comparison with fingerprints
in law-enforcement databases. This database was once established solely for the
purpose of determining the EU Member State responsible for asylum applica-
tions, but can now under certain circumstances be used for law-enforcement
purposes (Regulation (EU) No. 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 26 June 2013). The amount of (personal) data on modern-day
mobile devices can be enormous and they may therefore be a valuable source
for authorities, but it is questionable whether the use of data for anything other
than the limited purpose for which it was gathered is actually legitimate.
Another issue relates to the question of how to analyse all the gathered data.
While the immigration authorities currently still only have the capacity to use
data-carrier extraction selectively, the Dutch aliens police aims at 100 per cent
data-carrier extraction in the near future (Thüer et al. (2018) report that similar
legal possibilities have been created in Austria). All of this data will be stored in a
central database. Tools are currently being developed to systematically search this
data using specially developed queries, based on indicators or profiles of persons
who may pose a risk, albeit not by the aliens police, but by the counterterrorism
police (R1). This raises the potential for ‘social sorting’, i.e. the identification of
certain groups posing a risk based on certain criteria or categories, which could
have self-reinforcing effects and thus lead to discrimination (Das and
Schuilenburg 2018; Jumbert et al. 2018).
Some of the developments described above, such as the increased extraction of
information from data carriers and the development of smart tools to analyse the
obtained ‘big data’ by governmental authorities but also by commercial compa-
nies (companies such as T3K, MSAB and Cellebrite; see Meaker 2018; Privacy
International 2019), perfectly fit the development of what some authors have
referred to as the ‘EU Security-Industrial Complex’ (TNI and Statewatch 2017).
With regard to immigration management, the EU and European countries in-
creasingly modify legislation, develop new strategies and invest large amounts of
money in developing and building technologies to ensure the security of EU
citizens. This study on social-media and mobile-device vetting in asylum proce-
dures provides an illustration of these developments. At the same time, it is ques-
tionable to what extent the steps taken are proportional to the results of these
efforts and to what extent fundamental human rights, including privacy, are suf-
ficiently safeguarded. It is therefore imperative to have more public, evidence-
based discussions about these issues on a national as well as a European level.
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GREGORY, S. (2015) ‘UbiquitousWitnesses:Who Creates the Evidence and the Live(d) Experience
of Human Rights Violations?’. Information, Communication & Society 18(11): 1378–1392.
HACSEK, Z. andVISNANSKY, B. (2017)The Impact of SocialMedia on the Smuggling ofMigrants,
Regional Academy of the United Nations, http://www.ra-un.org/uploads/4/7/5/4/47544571/2_
unodc_2_final_paper.pdf (accessed July 2019).
HAMEL, J.-Y. (2009) Information and Communication Technologies and Migration, United Nations
Development Programme, Human Development Reports, Research Paper 2009/39, https://mpra.
ub.uni-muenchen.de/19175/1/MPRA_paper_19175.pdf (accessed July 2019).
HUMANRIGHTSCENTERUCBERKELEYSCHOOLOFLAW (2018)TheNewForensics:Using
Open Source Information to Investigate Grave Crimes, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2018/02/Bellagio_report_2018_9.pdf (accessed July 2019).
IMMIGRATIE EN NATURALISATIEDIENST (IND; NETHERLANDS IMMIGRATION
SERVICE) (2016) ‘Screenen in het Asielproces. IND-interne basisinstructie voor de screener’, ver-
sion 1.0, 8 March, copy on file with the authors.






/jrs/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jrs/feaa029/5827894 by Vrije U
niversiteit Am
sterdam
 user on 01 April 2021
INSPECTIE JUSTITIE EN VEILIGHEID (INSPECTORATE OF JUSTICE AND SECURITY)
(2016) De identificatie van asielzoekers in Nederland: Vervolgonderzoek naar de Registratie en
Identificatie van Asielzoekers door Politie en Koninklijke Marechaussee. The Hague: Inspectie
Justitie en Veiligheid.
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THÜER, L., FANTA, A. and KÖVER, C. (2018) ‘Asylum Procedure: Cell Phone Search Has No
Benefits’, UNHCR blogs, 16 July, https://www.unhcr.org/blogs/asylum-procedure-cell-phone-
search-no-benefits/ (accessed July 2019).
TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE (TNI) and STATEWATCH (2017) Market Forces: The
Development of the EU Security-Industrial Complex, https://www.tni.org/files/publication-down
loads/marketforces-report-tni-statewatch.pdf (accessed July 2019).
VANDERWOUDE,M. A. H., BARKER, V. andVANDERLEUN, J. P. (2017) ‘Crimmigration in
Europe’. European Journal of Criminology 14(1): 3–6.
ZIJLSTRA, J. and VAN LIEMPT, I. (2017) ‘Smart(Phone) Travelling: Understanding the Use and
Impact ofMobile Technology on IrregularMigration Journeys’. International Journal ofMigration
and Border Studies 3(2/3): 174–191.






/jrs/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jrs/feaa029/5827894 by Vrije U
niversiteit Am
sterdam
 user on 01 April 2021
